THE NEW RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE - RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM ITS SOVIET PREDECESSOR?

an analysis from Lars J. Gerdes, MA

Birmingham, May 2000

Introduction

Russia has been forced to respond to many internal and external political alterations since the end of the Cold War. On Friday the 5^th February 2000, the presidential Security Council adopted the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation.^[1] It replaces the ‘Key Provisions of the Military Doctrine’ of November 1993.^[2]

            Although Russia claims that the new doctrine ‘does not preclude forming partnerships with the west,’^[3] western officials were seemingly concerned with what they perceived as a ‘strictly anti-western’^[4] tone. Yevgeny Volk of the Heritage Foundation even sees in the new doctrine “a return to the Soviet pattern, the Soviet scheme whereby the West was regarded as an alien entity which always jeopardize Russian national interests.”^[5]

How does the present military doctrine differ from earlier Soviet doctrines? Is the new doctrine radically (defined as completely) different from its Soviet predecessor? This analysis is going to answer these questions. For that, the definition, structure and function of the military doctrine in Russia will be analysed and compared with its Soviet ancestor. On the basis of these theoretical and technical knowledge, the contents of both concepts will be examined in a bipartite contemplation. Firstly, the Russian view of basic threats and expected nature of wars will be investigated, before secondly the reaction in terms of military structure and use of forces will be examined.

            The analysis concludes, that the new Russian military doctrine is by no means radical different from its Soviet predecessor. In contrast, it is very similar to earlier Soviet concepts. It is true that there are several differences concerning the structure of the doctrine, new threats, and thus an extended use of conventional force, and even a new nuclear strategy, but these changes are to be explained by the Russian post-Cold War security situation and do not significantly alter the entire concept regarding the comparability to Soviet military doctrines.

            To examine the reasons for the Russian attitude (which range from NATO’s^[6] enlargement and NATO’s UN^[7] independent engagement in Yugoslavia, from western doubts about Russia’s economic reforms, and the military and political establishment, to reasons concerning the Russian military industry) would go beyond the scope of the question and therefore is not the concern of this analysis.

Definition, structure, and function

Although the structure of the new military doctrine is different from its Soviet predecessor, the covert issues as well as its definition and function seem very similar. This section compares definition, structure, and function of the present military doctrine with its Soviet forerunner and searches for parallels and differences. Additionally, the Russian understanding of the term ‘military doctrine’ will be compared with the western definition.

Whereas in the West the term ‘military doctrine’, if it is used at all, generally embraces tactical principles and regulations for the use of force (in the United States, for instance, there is a ‘navy doctrine’, ‘tactical doctrine’, ‘air force doctrine’, and so on)^[8], it always had a much more meaningful sense in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s military doctrine was the military policy of the communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and its edicts had the force of law.^[9] Marshal A. A. Grechko, former Soviet Minister of Defense, aptly defined Soviet military doctrine in 1974 in a few words as ‘a system of views on the nature of war and methods of waging it, and on the preparation of the country and army for war, officially adopted in a given state and in its armed forces.’^[10] With a post-Cold War interpretation of ‘war’ as also including armed conflicts, Grechko’s definition is just as applicable for the Russian military doctrine of the year 2000. The most recent published draft outlines its meaning in ‘the role of the countries authorities in ensuring defence and, if necessary, preparing for and waging war’ and in ‘descriptions of the environments in which the Russian armed forces might have to operate.’^[11]

            The structure of military doctrines in the Soviet Union is different from the present Russian one. Soviet theorists always stressed a two-sided military doctrine, the political (or social-political) and military-technical (or scientific-technical).^[12] In contrast, today’s Russian doctrine is divided into three parts: the military-political principles, the military-strategic principles, and the military-economic principles. However, the covert issues are very similar: both encompass the whole spectrum of war and conflict, inclusive of the Russian/Soviet attitude towards war and conflict, including the sources and nature of military danger, the organisation of the economy, and the principles of military preparation.^[13] The new separated treatment of ‘missions of the armed forces and other troops’ in the present doctrine is to be seen as an adaptation to the Russian post-Cold War engagement in former Soviet republics. Also the stress on economic aspects in a special section is a result from the experience of economic importance in connection with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

            The military doctrine of the Soviet Union as well as that of today’s Russia fulfils the same function. According to Christopher Donnelly, ‘the function of Soviet military doctrine has always been to produce a military machine capable of implementing Soviet policy by the means of war.’^[14] However, in reality it is much more. There are three main functions: the first is the political. This highlights several political changes in the Soviet history, expressed in new military doctrines,^[15] as well as the impact of NATO’s enlargement activities and the Kosovo crisis on Russian security policy,^[16] and the political aim for multipolarity instead of U.S. unipolarity emphasized in the recent doctrine.^[17] The second is the repository of wisdom and experience of wars and conflicts, including its implications on the structure and use of military forces. In the Soviet theoretical framework, for the study of war leading to the military doctrine, military history was always used as a basic tool for research and analysis.^[18] Obviously for the same reason, the experiences of the Gulf War in 1991 led to the priority to develop and exploit “the emerging high precision, mobile highly survivable, long-range, stand-off weapons” in the doctrine of 1993 (Official name: ‘The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Russia’s Military Doctrine’). The third function is that developing the doctrine provides (before as well as after the end of the Cold War) for constant discussion and debate, the identification of problems, the exchange of ideas and the implementation of new methods within the framework of military science.

            This section has shown that, despite a different structure, the new Russian military doctrine is very similar to its Soviet predecessor in terms of technical and theoretical aspects. The definition of the term ‘military doctrine’ has not been adjusted to the common western sense, but follows its communist tradition. Moreover, today’s military doctrine fulfils still the same functions as to the time of the Cold War. The covert issues in both doctrines are corresponding, minor changes are resulting from post-Cold War experience. However, for a complete examination of the differences and similarities between doctrines of both periods, it is necessary to look at the contents of the covert issues, i.e. to consider the Russian views and their following reactions. It is in this direction that the essay now turns.

Basic threats and expected nature of wars

The considered threats and the expected nature of wars are an important foundation in the heart of the Russian as well as of the Soviet military doctrine. This section will analyse and compare regarded sources and the expected nature of military danger in the doctrines of both periods.

Due to the Cold War security environment, the pivot of all military security thinking in the Soviet era, and therefore content of the military doctrine, was the threat of a world war resulting from a confrontation with NATO and, to a much lower degree, a confrontation with China. The expected nature of a possible war varied from an inevitably escalation to a nuclear war between 1956 and 1966,^[19] to the assumption that armed confrontations could hold “with or without the use of nuclear weapons”^[20] since 1966 (The numbers of nuclear weapons, an improved command and control structure, and hardened facilities had increased so that there was no longer the necessity to use nuclear weapons in the first minutes of a war. A further build-up of nuclear weapons and an increased superiority of conventional forces even led to Brezhnev’s {General Secretary CPSU from 1966-1982} unilateral declaration of no-first-use of nuclear weapons).^[21]

            Although the United States and NATO are not explicitly mentioned, the present military doctrine still considers NATO, and its enlargement, as the main threat. Moreover, at the core of the new doctrine is the concept of two opposing trends: on the one hand the threat of a unipolar world (meaning U.S. superpower domination), and on the other hand the desired multipolar world, implying many centres of influence including Russia.^[22] Besides this threat from the West, and to a much lesser degree, the possibility of a regional war with China is indicated. In addition, the doctrine stresses the threat of Islamic militants, who are battling Russia internal (for example in Chechnya) and are threatening with the governments of several former Soviet republics in Central Asia (for example in Tajikistan).^[23] The doctrine distinguishes between three types of possible war: global, regional, and local.^[24] Local wars are defined as wars that originate from economic, territorial, religious, or ethnic conflicts within the republics of the former Soviet Union. Regional wars originate from contiguous states that have large armies (e.g. China or Islamic nations). A global war originate from countries that possess strategic nuclear and/or non-nuclear weapons capable of reaching Russia (e.g. the U.S. or NATO).^[25] The possible use of nuclear weapons is associated with the latter two types. A global or regional war may start as a conventional one, but contains the risk of escalation to the nuclear level. It is also noted that a global or regional war can result from escalation of lower-level conflicts.

            Overall, the draft is compatible with a series of exercises that were conducted by Russian forces in summer and autumn of 1999. Among them, the most significant was the ‘Zapad-99’ (West-99) exercise, which simulated an attack by NATO on the Kaliningrad Oblast. According to the scenario, conventional troops were able to resist the attack only for a limited period of time. After that, Russia resorted to nuclear weapons.^[26] These exercises are very similar to Cold War scenarios. For example ‘Dnepr’, a major exercise in 1967, also began with a conventional phase and went nuclear after the third day.^[27]

            In summary, the Russian consideration of threats and the nature of possible wars in its military doctrine has not fundamentally changed in the post-Cold War era. As it did during the Cold War, Russia still considers NATO as the main threat to its national security. To a lesser degree, and also similar to Soviet concepts, the possibility of a regional war with China is indicated. What is new is the stress on the threat of Islamic militants, which can however be seen as a result of post-Cold War developments not given in Soviet times. It is not a radical change. The expected nature of war ranges from local conventional to global nuclear and regards a global war in pretty much the same way as Soviet approaches post 1966.^[28] To complete the examination one has nevertheless to consider the implication of these views on the military structure and the use of forces, and to compare it with earlier Soviet concepts.

            Military structure and the use of forces

Practical consequences concerning the preparation and the use of military forces follow the perception of threats and possible nature of wars. Therefore, this section analyses changes provided by the new military doctrine concerning military structure and the use of forces and compares it with doctrines of the Soviet Union.

The post-Cold War military-political situation caused changes in the structure and use of Russian forces, embodied in the military doctrine of 2000, which can be distinguished from the old Soviet Union doctrine by examining two main points: an emphasis on deployment of interventionist forces and an enhanced role of nuclear weapons.

The new role of nuclear weapons is seen as one main evidence for an anti-western attitude and provides a strong similarity to Soviet doctrines before the 1982 non-first-use pledge (NFU). The new doctrine firstly allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Secondly, nuclear weapons can, according to the new doctrine, be used against any country or coalition (not necessarily a nuclear state) if the situation is critical to Russian national security. The doctrine does not specify what is considered a critical situation, but common sense suggests that it means a situation when the integrity and sovereignty of the country is at stake.^[29] However, these extensions of the use of nuclear weapons are not necessarily anti-western. Rather, they are an adjustment to the regulations for the use of nuclear weapons from other nuclear powers. In other words, the new Russian approach to the use of nuclear weapons is in essence the same as the rules for the use of nuclear weapons of western nuclear states. According to the U.S. Air Force Doctrine, for example, nuclear forces are used to deter the use of WMD, and to provide against the emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat.^[30] These are exactly the same prerequisites as in the above explained Russian approach.

            Already in the 1993 doctrine, the 1982 NFU pledge was officially revoked. However, it is to be taken into consideration that the 1982 NFU was propagandistic and only possible on account of the Soviet superiority in conventional forces, whereas today’s Russian conventional forces are weak compared with NATO. No other nuclear states had followed the Soviet example in 1982.^[31]

            The increased deployment of interventionist forces should serve to resolve internal security problems (like in Chechnya) and ensure Russian influence in former Soviet republics. For that, the doctrine also provides the possibility to station troops outside the Russian territory.^[32]

            Moreover, the new security environment causes the stress of the need for comprehensive military reform in the new doctrine.^[33] For that, the commitment to military reform and remarks on the conscription are emphasized in the introduction. Conscription is intended to be used continuously, but a gradual shift towards a professional army is planned. However, there is no explanation of the nature and extension of reform or the reduction of force, and also the question of conscription is not mentioned in the doctrine after the introduction, which would prove the not-expectation of a large-scale war.^[34] However, it can be assumed that the reason for sticking to conscription is to be found in the financial situation of the Russian government.

            This section has highlighted that although the core function of deterrence, as well as national defence and the protection of allied neighbouring states, has not changed since Soviet doctrines, the use of conventional and nuclear forces in the new Russian doctrine is extended, and the structure has slightly changed. However, the change in the nuclear strategy can be explained by the increased weakness of conventional forces, and the extended missions of conventional forces resulting from post-Cold War security challenges within Russia as well as in former Soviet republics. By no means do they present a radical change in the military doctrine. The non-first-use pledge from 1982 was not a typically characteristic feature of Soviet doctrine, but only a form of short-term propaganda possible because of conventional superiority at this time.

Conclusion

This analysis set out to investigate whether the new Russian military doctrine is radically different from its Soviet predecessor. It analysed the structure and function of both doctrines and compared their contents regarding the view of threats and expected nature of wars as well as their impacts on structure and the use of military forces.

            Within a slightly changed structure, the present Russian military doctrine covers almost the same issues and serves the same political and military purpose as its Soviet ancestor.

Russia still considers NATO as the main threat to its national security, if not explicitly, at least implicitly. It is true that post-Cold War changes in the Russian security situation have caused the additional consideration of the threat of Islamic militants, but altogether the view of threats and expected wars remains close to that of the Soviet approach.

With post-Cold War security problems in the former Soviet republics and Chechnya, Russia is faced with needing a more interventionist use of conventional troops, and the nuclear strategy has altered in response to Russia’s relative weakness in conventional forces and has brought an adaptation to strategies of other nuclear powers. These changes do not however mean that there is now a radical difference from earlier Soviet doctrines, rather they are adjustments that have been taken to meet new security challenges and military realities. The Soviet military doctrine was never immutable, but always flexible to new circumstances and political strategies, whilst never changing its basic direction. The Russian military doctrine of the year 2000 follows this tradition and has adapted Soviet views to new conditions in the post-Cold War security environment without changing the basic direction.

Altogether, the Russian military doctrine of the year 2000 is by no means radically different from its Soviet predecessor.

Bibliography

-          Arbatov, Alexei, ‘Russian Military Doctrine and Strategic Nuclear Forces to the Year 2000 and Beyond’, paper for the conference Russian Defense Policy Towards the Year 2000, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA, 26-27 March, 1997, at http://www.mis.nps.navy.mil/nsa/Arbatov.htm.

-          Donnelly, Christopher, Red Banner – The Soviet System in Peace and War’, Hampshire 1988 (BAS Printers).

-          FritzGerald, Mary C., ‘The new Revolution in Russian Military Affaires’, London 1994 (Sherren Printers)

-          Nesirky, Martin, ‘Russia Updates Military Doctrine, Sees New Threats’, Antipas – My Faithful Witness, Yahoo News, 12 October 1999, at http://www.antipas.org./news/russia/military_doctrine.html.

-          Robertson, George (NATO Secretary-General), in ‘Russia’s military gives Washington a headache’, Journal of Aerospace and Defence Industry News, 15 October 1999, at http://www.aerotechnews.com/stark/1999/101599/Russian_Doctrine.html.

-          Scott, Harriet Fast, ‘Soviet Military Doctrine in the Nuclear Age, 1945-1985’, in Willard C. Frank, Jr., Philips S. Gillette, ‘Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991’, Westport, 1992 (Greenwood Press).

-          Scott, William F., ‘Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity or Change?’, in William C. Green and Theodore Karasik, ‘Gorbachev and His Generals’, Oxford 1990 (Westview Press).

-          Sokov, Nikolai, ‘Overview: An Assessment of the Draft Russian Military Doctrine’, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/sokov.htm.

Articles

-          ‘Russia adopts a new military doctrine’; The Seattle Times, 6 February 2000, at http://www.seattletimes.com/n…rld/html98/russ_20000206.htm.

-          ‘Russia’s military gives Washington a headache’, Journal of Aerospace and Defence Industry News, 15 October 1999, at http://www.aerotechnews.com/stark/1999/101599/Russian_Doctrine.html.

Documents

-          ‘Draft Russian Military Doctrine’, translation by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 October 1999; original source: ‘Krasnaya Zvezda’, Moscow 9 October 1999, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/991009.htm.

-          ‘Nuclear Operations – Air Force Doctrine Document 23’, Chapter 1.4, Secretary of the Air Force, 26 August 1994, at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/23.htm.

-          ‘On the Military Doctrine of the USSR (Draft)’, in Willard C. Frank, Jr., Philips S. Gillette, ‘Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991’, Westport, 1992 (Greenwood Press).